



FOREIGN POLICY bulletin

AN ANALYSIS OF CURRENT INTERNATIONAL EVENTS

VOLUME XXXI NUMBER 9

How Is Our Goodwill Reservoir?

by George B. Cressey

When Wendell Willkie returned from his memorable trip around the "One World" in 1942, he described the tremendous reservoir of good will which the United States enjoyed overseas. This is no longer true. A visit to 38 countries in four continents during the past two years reveals that the reservoir is low. Only in three countries where we are currently spending large sums—Greece, Turkey and Japan—is there much enthusiasm for the United States.

Despite our part in winning World War II and the many billions we have contributed since, we do not have many dependable friends. Only in a few places this side of the Iron Curtain are we actively disliked, but one has a nervous feeling that a tide of anti-Americanism may not prove impossible. This is a major misfortune. Why is it true?

Good will toward America is the product of a century. During that century we have been admired as a land of democracy and opportunity. Thousands of American missionary doctors and teachers have unselfishly gone overseas. Generous relief aid has always been available for people in need. Our leadership was moral; our motives were seldom suspect.

Until recent decades we had few political objectives abroad other than the maintenance of peace. Now that we hold grave responsibilities our actions too often flow from expediency rather than principle.

Two principles underlie our foreign policy. First, we believe in the democratic way of life and are committed to its support. Second, we oppose totalitarianism in all its aspects, whether of the left or of the right. We do not insist that all the world copy our version of democracy, but we believe that citizens are more important than the state. Communism and fascism equally debase human personality and produce governments which are a menace to peace.

One criticism of our policy as it often operates is that we have reversed the priority of these two objectives. In too many instances we have placed opposition to communism ahead of support for democracy. Most Americans assume that our gifts to Europe and Asia are motivated by generosity and are a free offering to help in rebuilding war losses. But many of the recipients regard these grants largely as a device for buying their allegiance in our contest with the U.S.S.R.

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One reason why we lost out in China is that the Chinese felt the United States had no direct interest in their welfare and merely sought to build a bulwark against the Soviet Union. China was to be our advance base, and if war came, it would too obviously be fought over Chinese territory. The fact that our policy supported a government which had lost the confidence of its people did not help our cause. In the case of India, it was asked whether we lent money to India to buy wheat out of friendship or to insure that the Indians would stay out of the Soviet orbit. Fortunately, at the last moment we eliminated the requirement that the loan be repaid in fissionable monzanite, the export of which is prohibited by Indian law.

Purpose of U. S. Aid

It is obvious that Soviet communism is a menace, but we cannot meet it without reliable friends. To have them we must prove ourselves friendly. Direct military aid is appropriate, but only where actually wanted and only as a project in mutual aid. Are the Point Four and technical assistance programs designed to improve living standards and advance human welfare, or are they an entering wedge for economic imperialism or political domination (or "advice")?

In the past America's reservoir of good will was due to disinterested service. When the Rockefeller Foundation gives millions for the elimination of yellow fever or the establishment of a great medical school, it does so for the welfare of man-

kind. When the Presbyterian Board of Foreign Missions establishes a college or agricultural station in India, it asks nothing in return. The International Red Cross and famine relief gifts have built miles of roads overseas. As individuals we have not sought to buy rewards, but the rewards have come. Since World War II we as a nation have deliberately tried to buy friendship and have failed.

Many of our allies do not share our frenzied concern over communism. In fact, no country is as alarmed as we are over the chances of war. Perhaps we see matters more clearly, but all vision may not be on our side. We fear war, and it is a catastrophe to be avoided if possible. But Marxist philosophy contends that communism can achieve all of its objectives without fighting. The Russians believe that our society will inevitably collapse, and all they have to do is wait or perhaps help speed along our coming chaos. We must beware lest our military efforts so weaken our economy and social order that we bring about the very decline which the Communists confidently await.

Belief in Democracy

America's greatest asset is not the gold at Fort Knox or the atomic products of Oak Ridge or the assembly lines of Detroit. We are strong because of our people and ideals. Moral leadership is still ours. It is shaken, but with an effort on our part it can be regained.

Do we really believe in democracy? Do we really believe that the

citizen is above the state? And do we believe this so sincerely that we will place it first, ahead of opposition to communism? Is it a hazardous luxury to act on principle rather than on expediency? The world around, millions look to us for moral leadership. We are free to act; they cannot. But what shall we say to friends of democracy when we enter an alliance with Franco? Fascist Spain is certainly an ally against Communist Russia, and military bases in Spain may be a major asset in our global strategy, but we thereby alienate a vast array of friends. In Spain the United States may have secured military assets but only at the loss of moral standing.

America can never be so strong militarily that it can afford to be without friends. Allies who really respect us are worth more than those whose allegiance varies with congressional appropriations. No one would propose that we leave our allies weak, but arms without morale are worth little. Nor is there any simple answer to the world's complex realities. The best way to have friends is to be friendly, so obviously and sincerely interested in our neighbor's welfare that we share his problems. If our foreign policy genuinely aids the democracies, the problem of communism is two-thirds solved.

(After 20 years of service as chairman of the Department of Geography at Syracuse University, Dr. Cressey has just been appointed Maxwell Professor of Geography. His travels in Asia have covered 150,000 miles, and he has recently returned from several months in Hong Kong. Professor Cressey is a former chairman of the Syracuse FPA and a former member of the national Board of Directors of the Foreign Policy Association.)

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How Much Authority for MSA?

The Foreign Affairs Committee of the House of Representatives was endeavoring to get rid of the "bureaucratic struggle" when on August 14 it recommended the establishment of a Mutual Security Administration—a single centralized agency charged with the execution of foreign aid programs for military, economic and technical assistance. The MSA is now in existence, and its head, W. Averell Harriman, has, as the committee recommended, "direct access to the President." Nevertheless, the "bureaucratic struggle" remains intense as other great agencies of the government contest the authority of the new organization. President Truman is said to be aware of this rivalry. If so, he could usefully recommend in his message on the State of the Union the centering of greater responsibility in the MSA. The present scattering of power weakens the influence of the United States abroad, since the foreign aid programs are the main buttresses of American foreign policy.

Military Assistance

The failure of the House Foreign Affairs Committee to remedy the problem it had in mind is obvious in the conduct of the programs for military assistance and technical Point Four assistance. The Defense Department is responsible for determining what any country eligible for military aid requires and for procuring that material. To carry out the first of these duties the department has set up in London a joint American military advisory group which reviews and screens the programs of the countries in the North

Atlantic Treaty Organization. In practice this procedure has given the Defense Department full authority to determine the nature of the military aid program once others have decided what countries are eligible. Thus the Director of Mutual Security has only a token authority, aside from the influence that he can bring to bear through his standing in the capital, over the most important segment of the general foreign aid program of which he ostensibly is in charge.

Under this system, industrial nationalism frequently vitiates the aim of the President, the State Department and the MSA, which is to strengthen the economies of the assisted countries by enabling them to increase their capacity for producing military items. Instead of encouraging our allies to make tanks, for instance, tanks for distribution abroad are to be made here, on the ground that the erection of new tank factories in Europe would delay production. The British would like to build at home helicopters for the use of the North Atlantic coalition countries, but the Defense Department has them built here because it is easier to get the raw materials to the United States than to Britain. This policy delays the distribution of tanks and helicopters and other items to our allies. Military production in the United States is too low to permit this country to satisfy from its own factories the Allies' need for weapons within a brief period of time. The Mutual Security Administration at best can prevent the Defense Department from carrying out undesirable policies; it cannot enforce on the Depart-

ment policies it regards as desirable.

The MSA shares with the State Department responsibility for executing the Point Four program. The geographic area covered by the MSA includes the Marshall plan countries (the Economic Cooperation Administration, which administered the Marshall plan, ended on December 31) in Europe and their dependencies in Africa and elsewhere, as well as a number of Asian countries—Burma, Formosa, Indochina, Indonesia, the Philippine Republic and Thailand. The State Department executes Point Four in Israel, Egypt and the other Arab states (including newly independent Libya), Liberia, Ethiopia, Afghanistan, India, Pakistan, Iran, Nepal, Ceylon and all the American republics except Argentina, which has no part in the foreign aid program.

Technical Aid

The object of this division of power was to give MSA authority in the key countries and to leave the State Department a vestige of the general responsibility which Congress thrust on it in 1950 in the Act for International Development. The State Department, however, continues to treat Point Four primarily as an opportunity to show Congress how inexpensively the government can perform an essential task. This attitude acts as a brake on MSA. The MSA could coalesce the triumvirate of foreign aid programs—military, economic and Point Four—more effectively than it does now if it had to share less of its authority with the State and Defense departments.

BLAIR BOLLES



Churchill Visit—A New Chapter

Unless all current portents prove to be mistaken, the January visit of British Prime Minister Winston Churchill to Washington will open a new chapter not only in Anglo-American relations but also in the relations of the West with the U.S.S.R. Mr. Churchill brings to his conversations with President Truman the weight of the successful, although far from placid, cooperation which he developed during World War II with President Roosevelt. He also brings the experience of a statesman who, after having vigorously striven more than 30 years ago to overthrow the Bolshevik regime in Russia by Allied military intervention, did not hesitate to offer Britain's support to Stalin on the fateful day in June 1941 when the Nazis invaded the U.S.S.R.

Who Can Help Whom?

Although the Washington negotiations will be overshadowed by the crisis once more facing Britain as a result of its efforts to superimpose rearmament on a gravely weakened economy, Mr. Churchill has indicated in advance that he is determined to place military and diplomatic problems in the foreground. His main endeavor will be to dispel any impression that may have arisen in this country that Britain, because of the material losses it has suffered as a result of two world wars and of nationalist movements in Asia and the Middle East, must henceforth play second fiddle to the United States. He is expected to point out that while the British do need various forms of aid from Washington, the United States, for its part, will be gravely handicapped

in its efforts to contain the U.S.S.R. unless it can have access not only to bases, strategic raw materials and other facilities in Britain's remaining far-flung colonial possessions but, most important of all, unless it can continue to utilize Britain itself as its defense outpost in Western Europe.

Mr. Churchill's hints about the value of British territory to the United States and about his country's fears that Washington might, in an unguarded moment, launch from Britain an atomic attack on Russia which might bring dreaded retaliation on the British people, indicate that he will make full bargaining use of the existing relationship between the two Anglo-Saxon countries, under which, in his opinion, each has equal need of the other. In fact, what some of our North Atlantic allies, notably France, have feared is that Mr. Churchill, with his gift of persuasive eloquence, might seek to establish an exclusive Anglo-American, or at best United States-Commonwealth, alliance in lieu of the various military and economic arrangements Washington has sought to work out with all of the nations of Western Europe. It was to allay this anxiety on the part of the French that Mr. Churchill paid a two-day visit to Paris on December 17-18.

The Truman Administration is expected to remain firm in its determination to preserve and strengthen the North Atlantic Treaty Organization as a whole and not to sacrifice it to the possibility of closer Anglo-American ties such as Mr. Churchill had adumbrated at Fulton, Missouri, in 1946. The British prime minister, in turn, will probably persevere in

his policy, which has the support of the Laborites as well as the Conservatives, of keeping Britain out of the Western European union urged by Washington while continuing to wish the continent well in its efforts to achieve unity. Mr. Churchill's position is that a European union, which, at one time might have offered the only possible bulwark against Russia, has been superseded by the development of the North Atlantic coalition, which embraces the United States and Canada as well as Western Europe and for that reason is far more appealing to the British than any kind of purely continental combination.

Because of domestic political considerations, the Truman Administration is not in a position at the present time to alter its policy of opposing recognition of the Peiping regime. Mr. Churchill seems to have no intention of rescinding recognition on behalf of Britain. Conversely, Washington is more inclined than the British Conservatives to make adjustments to rapidly changing circumstances in the Middle East.

What About Russia?

The dominant issue in the Washington conversations, however, will be the course that the United States and Britain plan henceforth to follow toward the U.S.S.R. It is a matter of personal pride for Mr. Churchill to disprove the charge made by some Laborites during the election campaign that the wartime prime minister is a "warmonger" who would lead his country into armed conflict with Russia. In an election year, when the charge that

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Was the Korean War Useless?

The prolonged truce negotiations in Korea have severely tested the patience of the American people. As daily news reports from Panmunjom have revealed one fresh snag after another about the line of demarcation, the exchange of prisoners and the measures to be taken to insure compliance with the terms of the truce, some Americans have urged the Truman Administration to carry the war to China's territory. Others have asked whether the Korean war, which has taken a toll of over 100,000 casualties in the ranks of American forces, has not been a useless war.

Questions About War

THE principal arguments made by Americans who have questioned the usefulness of the Korean war may be summarized as follows:

1. "The war in Korea could have been avoided if the United States had not given the impression by a series of official statements in 1950 that this country did not consider South Korea as within the perimeter of American defense. This point has been stressed on several occasions by Senator Robert A. Taft, notably in his book, *A Foreign Policy for Americans* (New York, Doubleday, 1951). In this book Senator Taft, speaking of Korea, says: "Here was a place which the Secretary of State and the chairman of the [Senate] Foreign Relations Committee gave the Russians every reason to consider a soft spot."

2. When the United States on June 25, 1950 decided to resist North Korean aggression under the aegis of the United Nations, it used so small a military force and received so little aid from other UN members that it did not really save the South Korean Republic from the horrors of war. While the members of the UN have been criticized for not giving adequate aid to the United States, the Truman Administration has also been criticized for forcing the UN to take action in Korea. For example, Senator Taft states in his book: "We got little aid from other members of the United Nations. Our own forces were so weak and limited that the country we were saving from aggression was practically destroyed." In a speech before the City Club forum of Cleveland on November 17 Senator Taft added: "Truman went ahead in Korea without the United Nations. He dragged the United Nations along. The United Nations was not insisting on any action."

3. When the Chinese Communists in November 1950 entered the Korean war, the United States was unable to take large-scale action against China because

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Justification of War

SOME of the arguments listed in the adjoining column have been discussed in the following letter, signed by several prominent historians and civic leaders, which was published in the *New York Herald Tribune* on November 20 and is reprinted here to present another side of the controversy:

"The prolongation of armistice negotiations in Korea is expensive in human life. We are in no position to judge the merits or demerits of the points in dispute, since they deal with military matters left to chiefs of staff. But our long-range objectives in Korea are the concern of all citizens, and those who hold strong views are under obligation to express them.

"We sometimes hear the opinion advanced that the Korean war has been useless and the United Nations action has not demonstrated the futility of aggression. In reality, the Korean war has shown that concerted defensive action can stop aggression and may from now on prevent it. The current defeatism in regard to Korea is not justified.

"The Communists violated the 38th Parallel boundary in June 1950, with the intention of abolishing it—of 'liberating' South Korea and uniting it with North Korea under a 'democratic' regime. When the United Nations intervened to stop aggression the Communists attempted to eject the UN forces from Korea.

"Last June, Jacob Malik indicated that the Communists might be willing to re-establish the 38th Parallel as the boundary line between North and South Korea. Since that time there have been numerous indications from the Chinese government that it is willing to renounce its early goal of 'democratizing' the whole of Korea. Thus, the United States and the UN have achieved a tremendous victory against aggression. The danger that the Chinese will attack once more in Korea, when they failed in June 1950

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Questions

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the United Nations was reluctant to enlarge the war and, for some time, even to brand the Peiping regime as an aggressor. This point, too, is stressed by Senator Taft in his book.

4. Because of our own relative military weakness in Korea and the limited aid rendered by other UN members, the United Nations failed to drive the Communists out of Korea north of the 38th Parallel and therefore also failed to unify Korea. The result, so it is argued, is that the United States and the UN, instead of achieving a victory, suffered a defeat.

5. This failure on the part of the United Nations demonstrates, it is contended by some Americans, that the international organization is unable to meet the requirements of collective security and proves that the war of the United States and other UN members against aggression was useless. Those who follow this line of reasoning reach the conclusion that American participation in the United Nations will not assure the security of the United States. Therefore, it is declared by some, this country should "go it alone" if subsequent events should indicate the need for more drastic action against Communist China.

THE EDITOR

Justification

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and again in December 1950, seems slight indeed.

"Under the circumstances, the goal of the UN action seems achieved and the decision of President Truman in June 1950 to fight aggression fully vindicated. The restoration of the boundary line, which the Communists wished to abolish, was the purpose of our military action. At present, however, we seem to be

fighting with substantial sacrifice of human life on both sides without any clear objective.

"The American people and the UN should clarify the Korean aims and see to it that men are not sacrificed except in strict relation to clearly understood and essential ends. Then the nations fighting in Korea against aggression will realize that their struggle was not in vain but, on the contrary, probably the greatest step forward taken by the UN—not in destroying communism, which cannot be destroyed through military effort alone, but in halting aggression now and in averting aggression in the future."

JOHN COLEMAN BENNETT, professor of Christian theology and ethics, Union Theological Seminary; CRANE BRINTON, chairman of Department of History, Harvard University; OSCAR CARGILL, director, American Civilization Program, New York University; RUFUS E. CLEMENT, president, Atlanta University; ERNEST HOCKING, professor emeritus of philosophy, Harvard University; HANS KOHN, professor of history, College of City of New York, well-known author; RALPH BARTON PERRY, professor emeritus of philosophy, Harvard University; LOUIS H. PINK, lawyer, chairman of board, National Public Housing Conference; CHARLES J. TURCK, president, Macalester College, and president of Association of American Colleges.

Spotlight

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the Democratic Administration has been "soft" toward communism is expected to resound from political hustings throughout the land, President Truman, whatever his personal view, may well hesitate to acquiesce in Mr. Churchill's frequently reported desire for a top-level conference of the heads of the Big Three.

Should this prove to be the case, Mr. Churchill may offer his services as a mediator between the United States and the U.S.S.R. This possibility was hinted at by Sir David Kelly, who recently completed two years of service as British ambassa-

dor to Moscow, in an article appearing in the *New York Times Magazine* of December 23 where he said: "There is a disquieting tendency to confuse being strong, in fact, with being 'tough' in negotiation. Here the British government and people have an important responsibility, for I believe the Russian feeling about Britain is fundamentally less anxious than it is about America and Germany, and when Generalissimo Stalin told me (I was one of the only three ambassadors in Moscow who had a conversation with him) that our two countries could eventually live side by side, I believe that in his own way he meant it."

If the United States should agree with the Churchill government that military strength is not incompatible with diplomacy, the Administration will have the advantage of being represented in Moscow by a new ambassador, George F. Kennan, who has been accepted by the Kremlin in spite of the fact that the Soviet press and radio have charged him with supporting projects to give "direct help to terrorists and spies." The Kremlin's acceptance of Mr. Kennan, regarded here and in Moscow as a leading architect of the policy of containment, has been hailed in diplomatic circles as a step toward easing East-West tension. Seasoned students of Russian policy, however, believe this acceptance was based on the Kremlin's belief that Mr. Kennan, as indicated by his recent book, *American Diplomacy, 1900-1950*, has reached a more mellow view of United States-Russian relations than he held when he wrote the famous "Mr. X" article in 1947 and now may not be too far apart from Mr. Churchill's philosophy that nations should endeavor to live and let live instead of trying to reform each other.

VERA MICHELES DEAN



FPA Bookshelf

BOOKS ON U.S. POLICY

Living Ideas in America, edited and with commentary by Henry Steele Commager. New York, Harper, 1951. \$6.

Prepared out of the conviction that most of the problems that confront Americans today are really old and familiar and that we can turn confidently for solutions to our own historical past, this anthology sponsored by the American Library Association contains excerpts from the writings of Thomas Jefferson to Carl Sandburg which describe and interpret the American idea.

Joe Tumulty and the Wilson Era, by John M. Blum. Boston, Houghton Mifflin, 1951. \$4.

This highly readable biography of the only man close to Woodrow Wilson throughout the President's political career helps to explain many of the controversies of his administration. Further light is cast on United States party politics which continued unabated during World War I and contributed so much to the defeat of the Versailles treaty and the League of Nations.

Major Problems of United States Foreign Policy 1951-1952, by the staff of the International Studies Group of the Brookings Institution. Washington, Brookings, 1951. \$3.

For the fifth consecutive year the Brookings Institution has provided an analysis of the events and trends shaping United States foreign policy of the current year, and an appraisal of its main objectives. The policy-making processes of the U.S.S.R., Great Britain and the European nations are included. The current volume contains a special problem paper on collective security action under the General Assembly of the United Nations. It is supplemented by charts and maps.

The Memoirs of Herbert Hoover: Years of Adventure, 1874-1920. New York, Macmillan, 1951. \$4.

The first installment of the memoirs of America's only living ex-President tells of his boyhood and life as an engineer; of World War I and his role as head of a great international venture, the Commission for Relief in Belgium, and of his relations to the making of the treaty of Versailles. Here may be traced Hoover's transition from his espousal of generous internationalism to an isolationist position.

Inside U.S.A., by John Gunther. New York, Harper, 1951. \$3.

Mr. Gunther has revised his popular political almanac about the United States, adding 40,000 words of new material on such subjects as the draft-Eisenhower movement, the Kefauver investigation and the Nevada atomic bomb experiments.

My First Eighty-three Years in America, by James W. Gerard. New York, Doubleday, 1951. \$3.50.

Determined to enjoy life twice, "once in reality and once in retrospect," the author has set down his recollections of a long and distinguished career in public life, "Democrat by Democrat, through Wilson, Franklin Roosevelt and his determined heir, and the Century of the Common Man." Of particular interest is the account of Gerard's four years as President Wilson's ambassador to Germany.

In Defense of the National Interest: A Critical Examination of American Foreign Policy, by Hans J. Morgenthau. New York, Knopf, 1951. \$3.50.

A vigorously realistic appraisal of this country's foreign policy since the end of World War II, which avoids the pitfalls both of sentimentalism and character assassination. The author, professor of political science at the University of Chicago, does not hesitate to criticize the Administration but at the same time points out the fallacies of many of its critics.

This American People, by Gerald W. Johnson. New York, Harper, 1951. \$2.75.

This book examines, in lively manner, the basic principles on which this country was founded and their relation to present-day problems, the most striking of which is the new status of the United States as a world power. The author believes that "to be American is more than being an American," which, he says, is not only glorious but also difficult and dangerous—and a great challenge that our history can help us to meet.

The Forrestal Diaries, edited by Walter Millis with the collaboration of E. S. Duffield. New York, Viking Press, 1951. \$5.

This compilation of the private notes, reports, letters and recorded conversations of James Forrestal, the first American Secretary of Defense, provides important documentation on the forging of United States foreign policy from 1944 to 1949. Continuity and explanatory notes have been furnished by the editors.

The Roosevelt Treasury, edited by James N. Rosenau. New York, Doubleday, 1951. \$5.

Selections chosen from his own speeches and from the writings of his contemporaries, critics as well as friends, present a rounded portrait of Roosevelt, the leader, the politician, the man. The editor's informative chapter introductions provide the necessary continuity.

Seven Decisions That Shaped History, by Sumner Welles. New York, Harper, 1951. \$3.

The former Under Secretary of State tells his own story of what he considers seven crucial diplomatic events during the presidency of Franklin D. Roosevelt: He discusses the Teheran and Yalta conferences, Latin American policy, the decision to set up the UN, recognition of the Vichy government and a number of other controversial issues, throwing many interesting sidelights on the interplay of interests and personalities in the formulation of policy.

A Soldier's Story, by Omar N. Bradley. New York, Holt, 1951. \$5.

The man who led the Twelfth Army Group in the liberation of Europe adds another volume to the history of World War II. This is primarily the story of the ground forces as seen from the general's command post.

Career Ambassador, by Willard L. Beaulac. New York, Macmillan, 1951. \$3.50.

One of the first foreign-service career officers, Mr. Beaulac recounts his experiences in Mexico, Honduras, Chile, Haiti, Nicaragua and Cuba in the interwar years. He was embassy counsellor in Madrid during World War II and ambassador to Colombia during the 1948 Bogotá inter-American conference, and he provides an enlightening commentary on American policy in the countries to which he was assigned.

Man Was Meant to Be Free, by Harold E. Stassen, edited by Amos J. Peaslee. New York, Doubleday, 1951. \$3.50.

This collection of speeches and other statements by the former governor of Minnesota goes back to 1940 and includes the transcript of his 1947 conference with Stalin and his 1950 letter to the Soviet premier, as well as a good many addresses dealing with foreign policy.

THE UNITED NATIONS

The Political Role of the General Assembly, by H. Field Haviland, Jr. New York, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 1951. \$2.75.

In this book the author tells how and why the General Assembly has assumed political function originally assigned to the Security Council—an increase in the Assembly's authority which Dr. Haviland believes will strengthen rather than weaken the UN. Twenty-two issues brought before the Assembly, among them Palestine, the Italian colonies and Korea, are discussed in detail.

As Others See Us

The pros and cons of European union and of a European army continue to be vigorously debated in the press of the Western European nations. One aspect of this debate which has received little attention here is that both the supporters and opponents of European union as advocated by Washington are concerned with the need to make their nations independent of the United States. Supporters of European federation hope that a united continent would ultimately be able to act independently of both the United States and the U.S.S.R. Opponents fear that the United States may use a European union to encroach on the sovereignty of its Western European allies.

The influential independent German weekly, *Die Zeit*, of Hamburg says that it would be wrong to put all the blame on Britain for the present "crisis of the European idea." In its opinion France's "much too ambitious plans" (France is at present strongly backed by the United States), which Britain, Scandinavia and the Low Countries cannot subscribe to, are also responsible. "The time has come to be more

modest and realistic. The problem now is not to build a unified European state, but to raise in the shortest possible time a European army ready to fight. . . . French logic demands that such an army be topped by a complete political structure. The empiricism of other countries, however, would be satisfied with the already existing supranational institutions of the Atlantic organization, at whose disposal the European army is to be placed anyway."

In the independent French-language newspaper of Switzerland, *Gazette de Lausanne*, Pierre Béguin, its editor, writes: "The nations of Europe have not traveled one quarter of the road that might lead them in the near future to a really coherent federation. This is too readily forgotten by the doctrinaires of European federalism and not understood by the Americans. As far as international collaboration is concerned, Europe has not got beyond the age of coalitions."

The Gaullists are angry at the accusations of anti-Europeanism and anti-Americanism which have been leveled against them because of General de Gaulle's opposition to the Schuman plan, the European army and American bases on French territory. Certain Americans, says a writer in the official Gaullist organ-

Le Rassemblement, "make the mistake of confusing servility and friendship." He asks, "Would the Americans refuse France the independence of ideas and language which they consent to in a Tito?"

Roberto Cantalupo, Italian commentator widely known before World War II, expresses anxiety in the independent weekly *Tempo* of Milan about "the deep crisis of the Atlantic pact" at the Rome conference of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization in November. This conference, he contends, revealed "fundamental weaknesses in the West's military plans." Another Italian commentator, Antonio Calvi, writing in the liberal weekly *Il Mondo* of Rome, says that the mere threat of American intervention would probably have been sufficient to avert war in 1939 but now is no longer enough to insure peace. What worries him most is the tendency that he detects in recent American statements which in his opinion indicate a desire not to sacrifice American civilian consumption for the sake of building conventional armaments and "an excessive confidence in atomic weapons." This, Calvi declares, is a repetition of the type of thinking prevalent in Britain in 1939, when British leaders did not consider it necessary to have strong forces on the European continent.

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In the next issue

A Foreign Policy Report

The Philippine Economy

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